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Abstract
This paper presents novel data on the German discourse particle 'wohl', which has been analyzed as a marker
of uncertainty by Zimmermann (2008), and argues for treating 'wohl' as an inferential evidential. The
argument is twofold. First, in declaratives 'wohl' is felicitous in contexts the respective modified proposition is
known to be true, which is incompatible with an account in terms of uncertainty. Second, the distribution of
'wohl' in interrogatives is more complex and more restricted than assumed by the standard account: Following
Truckenbrodt (2006), I assume that V2-interrogatives are undirected questions that can be licensed by 'wohl'
but whose undirectedness effect is independent of 'wohl'. V-final interrogatives, on the other hand, are
canonical directed questions but can only host 'wohl' when targeting content that cannot be known directly.
The final analysis is couched in the framework of Murray (2010), proposing that 'wohl' contributes a not at-
issue restriction of the common ground to those worlds in which the speaker (in declaratives) or addressee (in
interrogatives) has inferential evidence.
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1 Introduction
The German discourse particle wohl 1 has been analyzed as a marker of uncertainty by Zimmermann
(2008, 2011) (see also Eckardt 2015) that may best be translated into English as presumably, as in
the declarative sentence in (1). For interrogatives, Zimmermann takes wohl to indicate a request for
a less committed answer, as in (2).2
(1) Hein
H.
ist
is
wohl
WOHL
auf
at
See.
sea
declarative
’Presumably, Hans is at sea.’
(Zimmermann 2008, (1b), my translation)
(2) Hat
Has
Hania
H.
wohl
WOHL
auch
also
ihre
her
Chefin
boss-fem
eingeladen?
invited
interrogative
’What is your guess: Did she or didn’t she invite her boss?’
(Zimmermann 2008, (7b))
This paper presents novel data against Zimmermann (which I will refer to as the standard account)
that is twofold. First, wohl can occur in declaratives in contexts that are incompatible with an account
in terms of uncertainty. Second, I will argue that the distribution of wohl in interrogatives is more
complex than Zimmermann assumes insofar as it can only occur in a question without an accessible
answer. Moreover, the contribution of wohl in interrogatives interacts with the T-to-C movement
of the verb, for which I will adopt Truckenbrodt’s (2006) proposal that V-final interrogatives are
undirected questions whose speech act lack an addressee. In light of this data, I will propose an
account of wohl as an inferential evidential, opening up interesting cross-linguistic connections with
”evidential” languages like Cheyenne (Murray 2010).
The structure of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 present a brief sketch of the
standard account and the novel data for declaratives and interrogatives respectively. The proposed
analysis is given in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 elaborates on the mentioned cross-linguistic connection
and Chapter 6 concludes the paper.
2 wohl in Declaratives
According to the standard account by Zimmermann (2008: 202), ”wohl expresses a certain degree
of epistemic uncertainty about the proposition of the clause it occurs in”. Evidence for this charac-
terization comes from a restriction against wohl in factive attitude contexts, either cross-sentential
∗First and foremost, I’m grateful to Patrick Grosz for getting me interested in discourse particles and for
constant comments on this project. I’d also like to thank Rajesh Bhatt, Seth Cable, Ailı´s Cournane, Magda
Kaufmann, Stefan Keine, Andrew McKenzie and Lisa Matthewson for helpful feedback, as well as audiences
at the UConn Logic Group, the UMass Semantics Workshop and PLC 41. Special thanks to Jon Ander Mendia,
Marlijn Meijer and Emma Nguyen for random chit-chat and comments on the abstract. All errors are on me.
1German discourse particles are standardly assumed to resist stress but there are a few exceptions - including
wohl - where a discourse particle has a stressed variant that differs in meaning and is therefore treated as a
separate lexical item (although there have been unifying approaches). I will focus solely on unstressed wohl
here.
2Another common property of German discourse particles are their idiosyncratic sentence type restrictions.
In the case of wohl, only declaratives and interrogatives license the occurrence of wohl, while imperatives do
not.
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(3a) or in embedding (3b). Zimmermann (2008) captures the meaning of wohl via an ASSUME op-
erator that indicates weakened commitment towards a proposition p by the speaker (in declaratives)
or speaker and/or hearer (in interrogatives) (4).
(3) a. #Ich
I
weiß
know
genau,
for-sure
wo
where
Hein
H.
ist.
is
Er
he
ist
is
wohl
WOHL
auf
at
See.
sea
’I know for sure where Hein is. Presumably, he is at sea.’
b. #Ich
I
weiß
know
genau,
for-sure
dass
that
Hein
H.
wohl
WOHL
auf
at
See
sea
ist.
is
’I know for sure that Hein presumably is at sea.’
(Zimmermann 2008, (4a,b), glosses for (3b) added)
(4) J wohl p K = ASSUMEx (p) (with x = speaker, hearer, or both)
Contra this account, there are cases when wohl can be used in a context where the proposition it
modifies is known to be true. For instance, consider the dialogue in (5). In the context of the
guessing game, Pascal is shown to be wrong, as explicitly stated by Mordecai. However, it is
felicitous for Pascal to reply with wohl, despite the fact that the modified proposition Pascal was
wrong is known to be true in the context. Thus, the data is incompatible with an account in terms
of uncertainty. Moreover, when we look at adverbials that are close to the meaning of wohl in other
contexts, we see that both strong and weak epistemic adverbials like wahrscheinlich (’probably’) or
mo¨glicherweise (’maybe’) are infelicitous while an evidential adverbial like offenbar (’obviously’)
is acceptable.
(5) [Context: Pascal and Mordecai, bored during the soccer break, are playing a guessing game.
Mordecai: Guess how much Tianjin Quanjian is offering Aubameyang.
Pascal: 20 million?
M: You are wrong, it’s 34 million!]
P: Hm,
well
da
there
lag
lay
ich
I
{ wohl
WOHL
/ offenbar
obviously
/ #wahrscheinlich
probably
/ #mo¨glicherweise
maybe
} falsch.
wrong
’Well, I was WOHL wrong.’ ≈ ’Well, looks like I was wrong.’
Another example that goes into the same vein is shown in (6). After years of amnesia (that were
profitable for semanticists and philosophers), Ernie Banks finally remembers his life as a baseball
player and is told by the nurse about his life in oblivion. Again, it is felicitous to use wohl in his reply,
modifying the proposition I could not remember (leaving aside the modal here), although it is evident
that he could in fact not remember. Furthermore, we observe the same pattern of acceptability with
respect to the alternative adverbials.
(6) [Context: Ernie Banks has recovered from his amnesia and is told by the nurse how he
couldn’t remember any of the things that had happened to him before his accident, and of
all the visitors he had. Ponderingly (and suddenly able to speak German), he says:]
Ich
I
konnte
could
mich
me
{wohl
WOHL
/ offenbar
obviously
/ #wahrscheinlich
probably
/ #mo¨glicherweise}
maybe
nicht
not
erinnern.
remember
’I could WOHL not remember.’ ≈ ’Seems like I couldn’t remember.’
I conclude from these examples that an account a` la Zimmermann (2008) in terms of uncertainty is
not sustainable. Rather, I propose that wohl in declaratives is an indicator of the speaker’s evidence,
as supported by the overlap with the evidential adverbial in (5)-(6). In contrast to a (plain) epistemic
modal, an evidential simply encodes a source of evidence and is thus compatible with a proposition
whose truth-value is known.3 However, it is also for this reason that the use of wohl usually conveys
a lack of commitment insofar as the relativization to a particular source of evidence is pragmatically
weaker than an assertion without it.
3It should be noted that in both examples provided here the proposition is true. I was not able to find an
example with a known false proposition. Future research will have to show whether this data gap can be filled
or, if not, whether there is something deeper about it.
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An obvious next question is what kind of evidence wohl encodes. To find out, I will follow
the classification by Willett (1988) and adopt examples from Matthewson 2015 originally used to
investigate the epistemic modal must. For reasons of space, I will provide a summary in the Table 1
below and restrict myself to a few crucial examples.
Direct Evidence Indirect Evidence
Visual Auditory Other senses Reported
(trustworthy)
Reported
(untrustworthy)
Inferred
must 7 7 7 7 7 3
wohl 7 7 7 7 7 7 / 3
Table 1: Summary of data from Matthewson (2015: (9)-(19)) on must and its application to wohl
As representative for the first three columns indicating types of direct evidence, (7) shows the in-
felicity of wohl in such contexts. Regarding reportative evidence, wohl is infelicitous with both
trustworthy and untrustworthy reports (depending on the assumed reliability of the source of the
report, here Belinda), as (8) shows.
(7) [Context: The speaker sees the rain.]
#Es
it
regnet
rains
wohl.
WOHL
’It is WOHL raining.’
(8) [Context: Belinda tells the speaker that Bob is home.]
#Bob
B.
ist
is
wohl
WOHL
zuhause.
at-home
’Bob is WOHL home.’
A peculiar case is that of inferred evidence, as shown in (9). Although inferences seem to be what
licenses wohl in most cases, as is true for (9), the felicity seems to depend on the speaker’s attitude
during the utterance. That is, it seems only felicitous as long as the speaker remains rather calm and
disengaged from the danger that is looming in her kitchen. In contrast, if the speaker shows (the
appropriate) fear as reaction to the possibility of her house burning down, the utterance becomes
infelicitous. This is made overt in (9b) by adding an expressive verdammt (’damn’).
(9) [Context: The speaker smells a smell like burning meat while sitting at her desk an hour
after having put a casserole into the oven.]
a. Ich
I
habe
have
wohl
WOHL
das
the
Fleisch
meat
verbrannt.
burned
b. #Verdammt,
damn
ich
I
habe
have
wohl
WOHL
das
the
Fleisch
meat
verbrannt.
burned
’(Damn,) I did WOHL burn the meat.’
One possibility to account for the interaction of wohl with the speaker’s attitude in (9) would be to
tie it to a more general restriction against exclamatives such that the use of damn in fact turns (9)
from an assertion to an exclamation.4 However, there is some evidence against such a stipulation
insofar as wohl can occur in exclamatives like (10). It should be noted, on the other hand, that these
cases are rather idiomatic such that they pose a potential problem for most analyses of wohl anyway.
I will thus leave further exploration of such cases for future research and conclude that the evidence
source of wohl is best captured in terms of inferences from reasoning.
(10) Du
you
hast
have
sie
them
wohl
WOHL
nicht
not
mehr
anymore
alle!
all
’Are you nuts?!’
4This option has been suggested to me by Seth Cable.
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Let’s see how an analysis of wohl as an inferential evidential can account for the data in (5)-(6). For
(6), Ernie’s utterance would then convey that he has inferential evidence that he could not remember
who he was during his amnesia. Of course, inferences are always inferences from something, here
the stories he is being told by the nurse. This raises the question how inferential evidence is different
from reportative evidence, since we saw that wohl was infelicitous in (8). Although solving this
deeper issue would go beyond the scope of this paper, I want to suggest a tentative answer based
on the data pattern so far and prefacing some of the discussion on interrogatives: While (8) is about
observable facts, the content of the modified proposition in (6) is about mental states that are not
”accessible” to a report. The respective evidentials are thus assumed to be correlated with the type
of content they are used to convey.
In the case of (5), the picture is slightly different insofar as the inferences are based on the
course of the game. That is, Pascal infers on the basis of his guess and the correct answer given
by Mordecai that he (= Pascal) was wrong. As in (6), the targeted content seems to be of a rather
abstract nature, concerning the falsity of a mental attitude of the speaker.5
3 wohl in Interrogatives
On Zimmermann’s unified analysis of declaratives and interrogatives, wohl contributes the same
ASSUME operator to questions but scopes over it in question formation to allow for a weakly com-
mitted answer. That is, for a polar question as in (11a) (repeated from (2)), rather than asking
whether the addressee assumes that Hania invited her boss, it requests an answer that grants some
degree in uncertainty, formalized in (11b). Crucially, the uncertainty is that of the hearer here, and
may optionally include the speaker.
(11) a. Hat
Has
Hania
H.
wohl
WOHL
auch
also
ihre
her
Chefin
boss-fem
eingeladen?
invited
≈ ’What is your guess: Did she or didn’t she invite her boss?’
(Translation according to Zimmermann 2008)
b. ? ASSUME { Hania invited her boss, ¬ Hania invited her boss }
However, I want to argue that this characterization is slightly inaccurate and overlooks some of the
more complex data. The use of wohl in interrogatives is much more restricted than the standard ac-
count assumes, both with respect to the linguistic form and the contextual parameters. For instance,
a direct counter-example illustrating this point is given in (12). Although the given context should
license the use of wohl along the translation predicted by the standard account, the question is rather
marked.
(12) [Context: Patrick and Magda are sitting in a windowless office without any clocks where
they have been working since morning. Since a long time has passed, they have no clue
what time it is. Patrick asks:]
??Sag
say
mal,
once
wie
how
spa¨t
late
ist
is
es
it
wohl
WOHL
gerade?
currently
’Tell me, what is your guess: What time is it currently?’ (predicted transl.)
Furthermore, the contribution of wohl in an interrogative seems to interact in peculiar ways with the
position of the (inflected) verb. (13a) below displays the canonical V2-syntax of a content question,
which turns into an undirected question by adding wohl, as in (12) above. (13b), on the other hand,
has V-final syntax, which is ungrammatical without wohl.6 This raises the question to what extent
(13a) and (13b) differ in meaning. To preface the following discussion, I will argue that V-final
5Admittedly, assuming that the content influences the distribution of wohl is a rather radical reconception
of previous accounts, whose merit will have to be shown in future research, for instance by considering corpus
data or experimental studies. More generally, it seems important to consider the contexts in which wohl occurs
rather than looking at isolated sentences, insofar as without context the content are the only cues available.
6V-final syntax would also be licensed in echo-questions, which show a different distribution however.
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interrogatives are undirected questions, following Truckenbrodt (2006). V2 interrogatives, on the
other hand, are close to Zimmermann’s characterization in inviting the addressee to ruminate about
something, if the hearer is in a position to do so (more on this in a second). I will discuss both
variants in turn.
(13) a. Was
what
hat
has
Emma
E.
(wohl)
WOHL
gemeint?
meant
V2
’What did Emma WOHL mean?’ ≈ ’What do you think Emma meant?’
b. Was
what
Emma
E.
*(wohl)
WOHL
gemeint
meant
hat?
has
V-final
≈ ’I wonder what Emma meant. . . ’
Let’s start with the V2 case, which allows a directed question, as shown in (13a). But what renders
(12) infelicitous then? I suggest that this is due to the content of the question, namely the degree
to which an answer is accessible. That is, neither of the interlocutors in (13a) can be assumed
to know the answer to the question since it concerns the thoughts of another person - something
inherently impenetrable by another person’s mind. On the other hand, using wohl in a question
like (14) seems infelicitous because it concerns historical facts that are can be easily known.7 One
way to conceptualize this - as I will - may be in terms of a presupposition that the addressee has in
fact inferential evidence,8 with established or observable facts of the world being less amenable to
basic reasoning. The example in (12) thus falls somewhere in between (13a) and (14) insofar as it
is unclear what the addressee could reason from to answer the question, as well as the current time
constituting a measurable fact of the world.
(14) #Sag
say
mal,
once
wer
who
war
was
wohl
WOHL
Deutscher
German
Fußballmeister
soccer-champion
1959?
1959
≈ ’Tell me, who do you think was the German soccer-champion 1959?’
This proposal also accounts for the fact that wohl is often used in questions that are future-oriented
- again an inherently unknowable matter -, for instance featuring the epistemic modal werden (’be-
come’/’will’), as in (15).9
(15) Wer
who
wird
become
wohl
WOHL
gewinnen?
win
≈ ’Who’s gonna win?’
Turning to V-final wohl-interrogatives, I will adopt Truckenbrodt (2006) by assuming that V-final in-
terrogatives are undirected questions that lack an addressee. More specifically, Truckenbrodt argues
that T-to-C movement of the verb is correlated with the presence of the addressee as a parameter
in the speech act. That is, while a canonical V2 interrogative like (13a) from above can be put into
speech act terms like (16a) which involves a request from a speaker S to an addressee A for some
information, the undirected question act corresponding to a V-final interrogative is not directed to-
wards an addressee, as in (16b).
(16) a. Formal: S wants from A that it becomes common ground what Emma meant V2
7Note that this is slightly different from saying that the infelicity originates in the speaker’s assumption
that the addressee knows the answer - it should be in principle acceptable to make a guess about something
that is more of a fun-fact. However, it might be the case that wohl-interrogatives about what may be assumed
to be general knowledge are more likely to be considered unacceptable without context because of implicit
assumptions about the knowledge of the speaker.
8Thanks to Lisa Matthewson for raising this issue.
9An informal corpus study on Cosmas II (http://www.ids-mannheim.de/cosmas2/) of 49 wohl-interrogatives
showed that in fact 25 contained a kind of modal. Of the remaining 24, 12 involved some kind of perspective
shift similar to (13) targeting the thoughts of someone else. Although there was no overt marker for the re-
maining 12 interrogatives that would indicate the content of the question to be a matter of speculation, it seems
reasonable to assume that the global context may serve this function as well.
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b. Formal: S wants that it becomes common ground what Emma meant V-final
Some evidence for this view comes from the infelicity of the V-final version of (15) in (17) be-
low. Whereas (15) is very natural in the provided context, the fact that the main function of a
TV-commentator is to provide commentary for her audience renders an unmotivated soliloquy prag-
matically infelicitous.10
(17) [Context: A TV-commentator during a tense race:]
#Wer
who
wohl
WOHL
gewinnen
win
wird?
become
≈ ’I wonder who’s gonna win...’
Crucially, on Truckenbrodt’s account, wohl does not contribute the undirectedness but is merely
’associated’ with it. This is evidenced by the optionality - despite a preference for its presence
- of wohl in undirected polar questions like (18) which are usually introduced by ob (’whether’).
Moreover, wohl is not the only discourse particle that can license V-final interrogatives, for instance
bloß in (19).11 However, it is unclear whether there is an obvious meaning difference in (18) whether
wohl is used or not, which raises the question why it is still more natural and rather frequently used
in undirected questions. I assume that wohl still contributes its standard meaning in those cases and
is well suited to form undirected questions since it indicates that the speaker asks for inferential
evidence, that is, wonders to herself. The pragmatic oddity of asking oneself directly - although
in principle possible - is thus minimized insofar as the speaker gives away her lacking knowledge.
Moreover, the not at-issue status of discourse particles - in contrast to regular modals - allows the
contribution to fall outside the scope of the question act.
(18) Ob
whether
Thuy
T.
(wohl)
WOHL
schla¨ft?
sleeps
≈ ’I wonder whether Thuy’s asleep...’
(19) Was
what
Stefan
S.
*(bloß)
WOHL
macht?
makes
≈ ’I wonder what Stefan is doing...’
A remaining issue, before moving on to the analysis section, concerns the syntax of wohl (and other
particles like bloß). We saw that - although not contributing the undirectedness itself - wohl (and
bloß respectively) is required in V-final interrogatives like (13b) (or (19)) to render the structure
acceptable. So far, we have seen that questioning speech acts can be licensed by standard wh-
movement in V2-interrogatives (13a), a complementizer in polar V-final interrogatives (18) or a
discourse particle in V-final content questions (13b) & (19). As a tentative solution to this problem,
I will adopt ideas from Keine (2016) who argues that the verb position is correlated with the size
of the clause it occurs in such that V-final clauses lack a ForceP projection that V2 clauses have, as
illustrated in (20)-(21). Slightly diverging from this view, I assume that V2 and V-final sentences
do not differ in clause size but that a ForceP has to be made overt to render an utterance a felicitous
speech act.12 This could either be done by verb movement, a complementizer or a discourse particle.
Such an approach to the syntax of discourse particles is in line with Zimmermann (2008, 2011) who
locates wohl as a sentence-type modifier at the ForceP level.
(20) Structure of V-final finite clauses
[CP . . . [TP . . . [vP . . . [VP . . . ] ] ] ]
(21) Structure of V2 clauses
[ForceP . . . [CP . . . [TP . . . [vP . . . [VP . . . ] ] ] ] ]
10Notably, this example requires some additional assumptions about speech acts in contexts where an ad-
dressee is present but not able to respond. Naively speaking, we might think of (17) as a rhetorical question.
11I am not aware of a proper analysis of bloß and will thus refrain from elaborating on the meaning of (19),
since it is rather difficult to intuit.
12Thanks to Rajesh Bhatt and Stefan Keine for this suggestion.
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It has to be noted, however, that this proposal is only tentative, since it is simplifying some of
the complex issues at the syntax-pragmatics interface. A direct counter-example (provided by an
anonymous reviewer) is shown in (22). Although the use of mag (’may’) is somewhat old-fashioned,
it licenses a V-final interrogative independently of the discourse particle or a complementizer. On the
other hand, it seems noteworthy that mag has a use as an epistemic modal quite similar to wohl and
often co-occuring with it. Consequently, to avoid treating modal verbs differently from non-modal
ones on a syntactic level, the data may (!) point towards a more semanto-pragmatic approach to the
problem, with the presence of modal operators licensing speech acts due to the way their semantics
are relativized to the knowledge of the discourse participants and thus making their presence overt.
However, I do not have a solution to this problem and have to leave it for future research.
(22) Was
what
Emma
E.
(wohl)
WOHL
gemeint
meant
haben
have
mag?
may
≈ ’I wonder what Emma meant. . . ’
Concluding this small excursion, we can move on to the proposed analysis in the next section.
4 Analysis
I will adopt Murray (2010) for the proposed analysis of wohl. I take her framework to be preferable
to others for two reasons. First, it provides the means to capture the pragmatic status of wohl as
contributing not at-issue meaning (Potts 2005), as shown by its resistance to a direct denial in B1 in
(23) (in contrast to the at-issue proposition, which can be challenged by B2). Second, it takes the
speech act level into account and provides a way to implement interrogatives as well as declaratives.
(23) A: Marlijn
M.
ist
is
wohl
WOHL
in
in
Ko¨ln.
Cologne
’Marlijn is in Cologne, I guess.’
B1: #No, you don’t have evidence that she’s in Cologne.
B2: No, she’s in Berlin.
Murray’s framework breaks a speech act containing an evidential down into three components: (i)
the presentation of what is at-issue, (ii) an evidential restriction, and (iii) an illocutionary relation.
A formalization of the declarative in (23) is shown in (24) as an illustration.
The at-issue component is the proposition without wohl in the first conjunct, namely that Marlijn
is in Cologne. The second conjunct represents the evidential restriction, which I represent as a
primitive predicate INF for inferences, that restricts the common ground prior to the utterance to
those worlds where the evidential restriction holds. INF takes as arguments a constant representing
the discourse participant relative to whose informational state the evidential restriction holds, i for
the speaker and u for the addressee, and the respective proposition p. We can thus think of this
evidential restriction as a relation between the respective discourse participant and the modified
proposition with respect to a particular source of evidence, in this case inferences.
Moreover, Murray uses two free variables v0 and v1 as update functions to bind the evidential
restriction and the illocutionary relation respectively (which I will not go into here but can be seen
as restricting the common ground via the evidential restriction (v0) and then updating the common
ground from there with the respective proposition depending on the illocutionary relation).
Finally, the illocutionary relation in the third conjunct is used to implement the illocutionary
force in question, in the case of a simple assertion asking the addressee to update the common
ground with the asserted proposition. The illocutionary relation is formally expressed as an ordering
relation ≤ such that the initial common ground now contains the proposition in question (putting
aside conversational moves of accepting or denying this update). However, since a declarative with
wohl does not necessarily convey that the speaker is certain about p, I assume a weakened ordering
relation ≤must(p), as proposed by Murray (2010) for the conjectural evidential (which seems to be
quite close to wohl but does not receive a formal analysis).13
13I take the conjectural evidential in Cheyenne and wohl to differ in the latter lacking a presuppositional
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(24) λp.(p = λw.in-cologne(w,marlijn)) ∧ INF(v0,i,p) ∧ p(v0) ≤must(p) p(v1)
Admittedly, this analysis does not say much about what counts as inferential evidence but simply
proposes that there is such a primitive that can be linguistically encoded. However, I take this to
be a general issue in the domain of evidentials, even though other types like reportative or sensory
evidence seem intuitively easier to grasp. Nonetheless, I hope that the data I provided in the previous
discussion, particularly with respect to which type of content can be targeted in a wohl-interrogative,
suggests that language is in fact sensitive to inferential acts. Future research will have to show to
what extent the data withstands additional inquiry.
For (V2-)interrogatives, I adopt Murray’s Hamblin-semantics for questions as denoting sets of
propositions for the at-issue proposal. An illustrative formalization for the interrogative in (25) is
shown in (26), where the first two conjuncts represent the open proposition that there is something
that Emma did (or that something applies to Emma). The evidential restriction only differs from the
declarative in taking the addressee as argument rather than the speaker.14 Lastly, the illocutionary
relation is simply an equivalence relation that leaves the common ground unchanged since asking a
question is a request for an update rather than the update itself.
(25) A: Was
what
macht
makes
Emma
E.
wohl?
WOHL
’What do you think Emma is doing?’
(26) λp.∃P(P(emma) ∧ (p = λw.P(w,emma)) ∧ INF(v0,u,p) ∧ p(v0) = p(v1)
On this account, the evidential restriction functions like a presupposition such that the question
act is only felicitous if the addressee has inferential evidence regarding the relevant proposition.
This explains the distribution of V2 wohl-interrogatives we saw before where questions about easily
knowable content were infelicitous or pragmatically odd because it is unclear what would constitute
inferential evidence there that would allow the speaker to assume the presupposition to be satisfied.
This analysis can be extended to V-final interrogatives by assuming that they represent ques-
tions that are uttered relative to the speaker’s informational state, so only differ from (26) in having
i instead of u as the argument of INF. Additionally, we have to assume that V-final interrogatives
circumvent the presuppositional restrictions of V2 interrogatives because the person uttering the sen-
tence and assessing the presupposition is also the one whose informational state serves as argument
to the evidential predicate. That is, the speaker has privileged access such that any utterance seems
undisputable.
This account takes the contrast between V2 and V-final interrogatives to be one that rests on
pragmatic considerations rather than principled differences and predicts that there should be con-
texts for any V2 wohl-interrogative to be felicitous insofar as the presence of inferential evidence is
sufficiently specified. I will leave it to future research to see whether this prediction is borne out or
whether there is something deeper about V-final interrogatives.
5 Cross-linguistic connections
Before concluding the paper, I want to point out a potentially interesting connection between the data
presented here regarding wohl and other languages with “proper” evidential systems like Cheyenne.
Murray (2010) (see also Matthewson 2012 and Littell et al. 2010) reports an ambiguity that cer-
tain evidentials give rise to in interrogatives, illustrated in (27), a phenomenon she refers to as
”illocutionary variability”. While the interpretation in i. corresponds to the directed questions of
V2-interrogatives, ii. maps closely to the undirected (or self-directed) V-final interrogatives we saw
above.
requirement against direct evidence, since the observation that wohl is compatible with a true proposition is one
of the main points of this paper.
14An interesting avenue for future research might be trying to relate this switch to Truckenbrodt’s (2006)
account of how syntactic properties interact with the speech act level.
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(27) To´ne’sˇe
when
e´-ho’eohtse-se˙stse.
3-arrive-RPT.3SG
i. ’Given what you heard, when did he arrive?’
ii. ’He arrived sometime, I wonder when.’
(Murray 2010:75)
This parallelism may be seen as a promising link between the research traditions on discourse par-
ticles in German and languages with evidential systems like Cheyenne in the spirit of Kratzer &
Matthewson (2009). For instance, the illocutionary variability of (27) may be governed by syntactic
facts like T-to-C movement in German.
An additional interesting question concerns the type of evidential giving rise to illocutionary
variability, contrasting the Cheyenne reportative in (27) with wohl as inferential.15 Particularly with
respect to the claims proposed here regarding how the targeted content restricts the distribution of
the evidential, a cross-linguistic investigation seems most promising to support or falsify such a
view.
6 Conclusion
This paper argued for treating the German discourse particle wohl as an evidential rather than a
marker of uncertainty, as proposed by the standard account by Zimmermann (2008). For declar-
atives, I provided novel data that shows that wohl is felicitous in contexts where the truth of the
modified proposition is known and therefore incompatible with an account in terms of uncertainty.
For interrogatives, I showed that the occurrence of wohl is more restricted than assumed on the
standard account and interacts with verb movement from T to C. Following Truckenbrodt (2006), I
assumed that V-final interrogatives are undirected questions that lack an addressee and require some-
thing to make a ForceP overt, which wohl (and other discourse particles) is able to. The apparent
frequent use of wohl in V-final interrogatives was explained by its inferential semantics mapping
closely to what an undirected act of wondering corresponds to. In V2 interrogatives, the occurrence
of wohl was restricted (at least out-of-the-blue) by the content of the question such that only content
with an inaccessible answer was felicitous. This was explained by a presuppositional restriction in
wohl-interrogatives that the addressee has inferential evidence and the difficulty to conceive of what
this evidence might look like for issues whose solution is observable.
Besides the question about the nature of inferential evidence, I want to point out two other
open issues regarding wohl and the account proposed here. First, conceiving of wohl as an evi-
dential would render German an interesting hybrid case with respect to its expressions of epistemic
meaning insofar as it also has ’regular’ epistemic modals.16 This raises the question how wohl in-
teracts with epistemic modals like mu¨ssen (’must’). One idea alluded to previously could be that
epistemic modals pragmatically convey that the relevant content is inaccessible and thus license the
requirements on having inferential evidence. Another idea might be that wohl restricts part of the
pragmatically determined conversational background(s) of the modal. These two options would mo-
tivate the frequent co-occurrence from opposite sides, with either wohl making use of the modal or
the other way around. A relevant difference between modals and discourse particles might be in
terms of their (non) at-issueness that allow wohl to interact with meaning on the speech act level and
at least superficially justify its existence.
A second interesting question concerns the behavior of wohl in embedded contexts. Zimmer-
mann (2008) provides examples that suggest that wohl can be ’bound’ by an attitude holder rather
than be centered to the speaker, which is may be at odds with its not at-issue meaning. However, it
has been shown that the perspective associated with other types of not at-issue meaning may have
defaults that can be overridden. It may thus be interesting to see which perspectives are possible
with wohl in embedded contexts.
15Thanks to Lisa Matthewson for raising this issue.
16Thanks to Ailı´s Cournane for bringing this issue to my attention.
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